EW TONIAN scholars have long been aware o f a set o f draft Scholia to Propositions IV to IX of Book III o f the Principia (2). These were composed in the 1690's, as part of an unimplemerited plan for a second edition of the work. Since they describe supposed anticipations o f Newton's doctrines in the thought o f Graeco-Roman antiquity, they have become known as the 'classical' Scholia (3). The analogies and parallels drawn in them are so strained, as judged by modern standards o f scholarship, that it is tempting to consider them as merely literary embellishments o f a scientific However, the sheer bulk of the manuscripts, the number o f copies and variants, their relation to Newton's other writings, and the testimony o f Newton's associates together with their publication o f some o f the materials, all make it certain that he considered the arguments and conclusions o f the Scholia an important part o f his philosophy.
It would perhaps be possible to interpret the Scholia, with their dis cussions o f legendary figures and their references to a 'mystical' philosophy, as the work of the 'magical' (and hence aberrant) Newton-as eccentric productions that possess little significance for the reconstruction o f his genuinely scientific work, but merely throw light on his esoteric and occult interests. To us, however, this interpretation appears untenable. It is now amply clear that Newton's serious enquiries were not restricted to natural philosophy, investigated by an experimental-mathematical method. His studies o f theology and ancient chronology were of equal importance to him, and were pursued in as rigorous a fashion as his scientific work (4). There is sufficient evidence, even in his published writings, to show that he did not regard these different sorts o f enquiry as unrelated exercises. Rather, he shared the belief, common in the seventeenth century, that natural and divine knowledge could be harmonized and shown to support each other. work. 109 W e shall first describe the contents of these Scholia, and interpret them in the light of the statements of Newton's associates, and of other works by Newton. These materials will provide the basis for a re-examination of parts of the General Scholium and the Op At that tim Newton believed that he knew how God's agency operated in His created world, particularly in the cause of gravitation. Our analysis of the Scholia will show that Newton held (at least at the time of their composition) an equally firm belief about his own place among the prisci theologi who had possessed such knowledge. He believed, in brief, that God had once revealed these and other truths, but they had soon been obscured and had been partially rediscovered by certain antique sages. In this respect, Newton's work has close similarities with that of the Cambridge Platonists. These similarities may be more significant than the well-known similarity between Newton's doctrine of absolute space and that of Henry More. In re examining Newton's relation to the Cambridge Platonists, we shall see that he did not merely borrow ideas from them, but was engaged in a private dialogue whose terms were set by a certain intellectual tradition.
The study of the 'classical' Scholia should therefore deepen our under standing of the Newton's philosophical endeavour, and make it possible to relate his work to its contemporary English natural-philosophical and theological context with greater precision.
I
The first public hint of Newton's studies of seems to have been contained in a letter from Fatio de Duillier to Huyghens on 5th February 1691/2. Fatio had just then begun his work of preparing a second edition of the Principia, the task having been entrusted to him after his return from Holland the previous September. He w rote:
Monsieur Newton croit avoir decouvert assez clairement que les Anciens comme Pythagore, Platon &c. avoient toutes les demonstrations qu'il donne du veritable Systeme du Monde, et qui sont fondees sur la Pesanteur qui diminue reciproquement comme les quarrez des dis tances augmentent. Ils faisoient dit il un grand mystere de leurs connoissances. Mais il nois reste divers fragmens, pa 011 il paroit, a ce qu'il pretend, si on les met ensemble, qu'effectivement ils avoient les memes idees qui sont repandues dans les Principia Philosophiae Mathematica. Quand Monsieur Newton se seroit trompe il marque toujours beaucoup de candeur de faire un aveu comme celui la (5). It seems most likely that the letter was sanctioned by Newton and designed IIO to test Huygens' reaction. Newton would hardly have countenanced the mention o f these studies without his permission, and the last sentence o f the quotation expressly invites Huygens' comments. Hugyens' reply was courteous but negative (6). He doubted that such ancients as the Pythagoreans could have demonstrated elliptical orbits, although he was willing to credit them with knowledge o f certain general principles (like the heliocentric system and the balance o f weight and centrifugal force for maintaining the moon in orbit). He used Borelli's failure to demonstrate elliptical orbits as evidence for the uniqueness o f Newton's achievement, and then passed rapidly on to praise Newton's mathematical discoveries and urge their publication.
In May 1694, David Gregory visited Newton in Cambridge, and made 'Annotations Physical, Mathematical and Theological' from their conversa tions. Notes on the three topics follow each other in an indiscriminate sequence. Concerning the prisca, Gregory records:
He will spread himself in exhibiting the agreement o f this philosophy with that o f the ancients, and principally with that o f Thales. The philosophy of Epicurus and Lucretius is true and old, but was wrongly interpreted by the ancients as atheism. It is clear from the names o f the planets given by Thoth (the Egyptian Mercury)-he gave them, in fact, the names o f his predecessors whom he wished to be accepted as Gods-that he was a believer in the Copernican system (7). There can be no doubt that Newton intended to incorporate such material into the revised version o f the Principia; in July 1694 a memorandum o f Gregory described the extensive changes planned by Newton, and men tioned :
By far the greatest changes will be made to Book III. He will make a big change in Hypothesis III. page 402. He will show that the most ancient philosophy is in agreement with this hypothesis o f his as much because the Egyptians and others taught the Copernican system, as he shows from their religion and hieroglyphics and images of the Gods, as because Plato and others-Plutarch and Galileo refer to it-observed the gravitation o f all bodies towards all (8). Some of the materials which Newton then intended for inclusion in the revised edition o f the Principia have survived in a reasonably complete state. The main body o f text is a set o f fifteen folio sheets in Newton's hand, in the Library o f the Royal Society. Their contents are Scholia on Propositions IV to IX o f the Third Book o f the Principia, where the essentials o f Newton's doctrine of gravitation are set out. The material includes many references to, and quotations from, the ancients on the nature of the physical world. There is not space to present the material of these 'classical' Scholia extenso. We shall, however, give an indication of its character, and present important passages which he took to support these key propositions of the Third Book. Newton gave the manuscript to Gregory, probably on the visit of May 1694, either as a gift or as a loan. Gregory drew from it extensively for the preface to his Astronomia Physicae et Geometricae Elementa, som being almost identical with the manuscript (9).
The Propositions of Book III, for which the Scholia were intended, exhibit a carefully developed structure. The Book starts with six solar Phaenomena, obtained through astronomical observation and calculation. Then the first three Propositions state that the circumjovial planets, the primary planets, and the moon, are all retained in their orbits by a force which is mathematically described by the inverse-square law. The proof o f this is supplied by the first four Propositions of the First Book.
So far we are at the level of the mathematical description of the phe nomena. But Proposition IV states that the forces mentioned in the first three Propositions are the force of gravity. Thus it is a statement about a real force in the physical world, embodying the famous proof that the gravita tional force which pulls terrestrial objects to the Earth is the same as that which pulls the moon from its inertial path. By induction and by appeal to Rules 1 and 2, Propositions V and VI extend the reasoning to cover the primary planets and then all celestial bodies. Proposition VI also introduces the proportionality of gravity to the quantity of matter in a body, which leads to a discussion of the interstitial void in the corrollaries. But more importantly, Proposition VI not only asserts the generality of the action o f gravity in affecting all sensible bodies, but it implies that sub-sensible particles gravitate as well. This latter doctrine is explicitly treated in Propo sition VII. The inverse-square law of attraction is shown, in Proposition VIII, to apply not only to celestial bodies but also to their component particles. Finally, Proposition IX asserts the law of action of the real force of gravity within celestial bodies. Thus, by this series of extensions, gravity is concluded to be a completely universal force.
The central purpose of the 'classical' scholia was to support the doctrine of universal gravitation as developed in these Propositions, and to enquire into its nature as a cosmic force. This doctrine is shown by Newton to be identifiable in the writings of the ancients. As will become clear, he is not using this historical evidence in a random fashion, or merely for literary ornamentation. Rather, the evidence is used in a serious and systematic fashion, as support for, and justification of, the components o f Newton's theory o f matter, space and gravitation. The evidence is used to establish four basic theses, which correspond to the matter o f the Propositions IV to IX. These are, that there was an ancient knowledge o f the truth o f the following four principles: that matter is atomic in structure and moves by gravity through void space; that gravitational force acts universally; that gravity diminishes in the ratio o f the inverse square o f the distance between bodies; and that the true cause of gravity is the direct action o f God. W e shall analyse these in turn, using supporting texts from some associates o f Newton, and from Newton's other writings.
It will be recalled that Propositions VI and VII are concerned with gravity as a real physical force, moving both perceptible and imperceptible bodies in a non-resisting void. In the Scholium to Proposition VI, which includes 62 lines from Lucretius, Newton says:
Even the ancients were aware that all bodies which are round about the Earth, air and fire as well as the rest, have gravity towards the Earth, and that their gravity is proportional to the quantity o f the matter o f which they consists. Lucretius thus argues in proof o f the void (10). Newton then quotes twelve lines from Book I o f De Rerum Natura which state that void exists, and that o f any bodies which are equal in magnitude, difference in weight is explained by more or less interstitial void. This doctrine is discussed in the Corollaries to Proposition VI. Newton's comment on this passage is important:
Lucretius here relates gravity to the function o f the body, or its nature by which it is distinguished from Void, which has no gravity, and from this concludes that weight is always proportional to body. In this argument he includes all bodies, both imperceptible and perceptible. For he attri butes this gravity even to those atoms o f which other things consist. For he affirms that fire, and other bodies which are designated weight less, rise upwards not o f their own accord but by a force which drives from below, just as wood, which is a body with gravity, rises up in water, whereas all bodies are being borne downwards through void space (n ). Newton follows this with a passage o f twenty-two lines from Book II o f Lucretius, which shows his commentary to be, in part, a paraphrase. For the conclusion o f this Lucretian passage states, after giving the same example o f things which seem to rise upwards naturally: W e do not doubt, but that all these things, as far as in them lies, are borne downwards through the empty void (12) . Thus it is clear from his commentary and from the passages quoted, that Newton regards Lucretius as holding in the manner of the Principia that all matter whatsoever gravitates in a non-resisting void. Another quotation o f twenty-eight lines from Book II further supports this conclusion.
Newton then turns to the historical succession o f the atomical hypothesis, which is implicit in the Principia and explicit in the Lucretian passages:
This Lucretius taught from the mind of Epicurus, Epicurus from the mind of the more ancient Democritus. For certain persons, assuming the equality of the atoms, would have it that the gravity o f bodies is in proportion to the number of the atoms of which they consist. Others, to whom the atoms were unequal taught that gravity is proportional not to the number of the solids but to the quality of the solid. This distinction is supported by a quotation from Aristotle on the atomists, and by a reference to Simplicius, who places Leucippus and Democritus in the second position. For them, the 'quality' of the body is measured by the ratio of solid parts to void interstices, which together make up the body:
But by the levity of the void these philosophers did not understand any positive quality of the void, as Aristotle's opinion is, but merely absence of gravity. Newton concludes by bringing the 'Italic' philosophers into the succession:
Among the philosophers therefore who have held that bodies are com posed of atoms, it was a received opinion that gravity accrues both to atoms and to composite bodies, and that in individual bodies it is pro portional to the quantity of matter. That bodies are compound of atoms was the view of both Ionic and Italic philosophers. The followers of Thales and Pythagoras, Plutarch observes, deny that the section of those bodies which are subject to movement proceeds to infinity but ceases at those things which are individual and are called atoms (13) . In Proposition VII, Newton is explicitly concerned with the doctrine that the gravity of any composite body is the sum of its component parts which are held together by mutual gravitation. By analogy, he concludes that it follows that all celestial bodies mutually gravitate as the inverse square of the distance with respect to their components. Apart from the draft scholia in the Royal Society manuscript, there is another in the Portsmouth collection which is, in part, a summary of the longer set of scholia and which was probably intended as an alternative. Both documents are concerned with the absolute universality of gravitation. In the Royal Society manuscript there is a passage directly relevant to the main doctrine o f Proposition VII, namely, that the quantity o f matter o f any body is a function o f its parts:
Therefore just as the attractive force o f the whole Magnet is composed o f the attractive forces o f the individual particles o f which the Magnet consists, even so the ancient opinion was that Gravity towards the whole Earth arises from the gravity towards its individual parts. For that reason, if the whole Earth were divided into several globes, gravity, by the mind o f the ancients, would have to be extended towards each several globe, in the same way as magnetic attraction is extended towards individual fragments o f the magnet. And the ratio o f gravity is equally towards all bodies whatever. Hence Lucretius teaches that there exists no centre o f the universe, and no lowest place, but that there are in infinite space worlds similar to this o f ours, and in addition to this he argues for the infinity o f things in these terms (14) . Following this is another passage from Lucretius, containing an argument for the infinity o f the universe:
. . . if all the space in the universe stood contained within fixed boundaries on all sides and were limited, by this time the store o f matter would by its solid weight have run together from all sides to the bottom . . . N ew ton's comments on this passage are similar in the two manuscripts. The Royal Society manuscript reads:
The force o f the argument is that if the nature o f things were bounded in any direction, the remotest bodies, since they would have no bodies beyond them into which to have gravity, would not stand in equi librium but would by their own gravity make their way towards the things inside, and by flowing together from all quarters since infinite time would long ago have settled down in the midst o f the whole as it were in a lowest place. Therefore, to the mind o f Lucretius, each several body has gravity towards the matter situated round about it, and by virtue o f overpowering gravity is carried into the region where matter is more copious, and all worlds whatsoever have mutual gravity towards one another, and by their own gravity towards worlds which are in our direction are precluded from falling on to worlds which are in another direction (15) . An historical succession is added in the Portsmouth manuscript:
This Lucretius records from Epicurus' philosophy, Book I line 983, and Book II lines 1064 and 1074. N ow it is likely enough that Epicurus had learned all this from the mystical philosophers, seeing that Heraclides and the Pythagoreans and the followers of Orpheus said that all the stars were worlds in the infinite aether, as Plutarch has it in Book II, chapter 13, of the Beliefs of the Philosophers. This opinion also was held by Anaximander, who no doubt learned it from Thales, his teacher (16) . In the same document, Newton dates the atomic succession back to Moschus the Phoenician.
That all matter consists of atoms was a very ancient opinion. This was the teaching of the multitude of philosophers who preceded Aristotle, namely Epicurus, Democritus, Ecphantus, Empedocles, Zenocrates, Heraclides, Asclepiades, Diodorus, Metrodorus of Chios, Pythagoras, and previous to these Moschus the Phoenician whom Strabo declares older than the Trojan war. For I think that same opinion obtained in that mystic philosophy which flowed down to the Greeks from Egypt and Phoenicia, since atoms are sometimes found to be designated by the mystics as monads. For the mysteries of numbers equally with the rest of hieroglyphics had regard to the mystical philosophy (17) . Newton goes on to say that such 'immutable seeds' account for the fact that 'the species of objects are conserved in perpetuity'.
It may be difficult for the modern reader to imagine Sir Isaac Newton being serious about such supposed 'anticipations' of his views. Indeed, were it not for the testimony of Fatio and Gregory, one would most naturally interpret them as adding a classical flourish to a scientific treatise. But the draft Scholium to Proposition VIII cannot be interpreted in such a fashion. For here Newton asserts unequivocally that Pythagoras discovered by experiment an inverse-square relation in the vibrations of strings (unison o f two strings when tensions are reciprocally as the squares of lengths); that he extended such a relation to the weights and distances of the planets from the sun; and that this true knowledge, expressed esoterically, was lost through the misunderstanding of later generations. This is an instance of a fully developed prisca sapientia, and as such merits extended quotation.
By what proportion gravity decreases by receding from the Planets the ancients have not sufficiently explained. Yet they appear to have adumbrated it by the harmony of the celestial spheres, designating the Sun and the remaining six planets, Mercury, Venus, Earth, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, by means of Apollo with the Lyre of seven strings, and measuring the intervals of the spheres by the intervals of the tones. Thus they alleged that seven tones are brought into being, which they called the harmony diapason, and that Saturn moved by the Dorian phthong, that is, the heavy one, and the rest o f the Planets by sharper ones (as Pliny, bk. i, ch. 22 relates, by the mind o f Pythagoras) and that the Sun strikes the strings. Hence Macrobius, bk. 1, ch. 19, says: 'Apollo's Lyre o f seven strings provides understanding o f the motions o f all the celestial spheres over which nature has set the Sun as moderator.' And Proclus onPlato'sTimaeus,bk. 3, page 200, 'The number seven they have dedicated to Apollo as to him who embraces all symphonies whatsoever, and therefore they used to call him the God the Hebdomagetes', that is the Prince of the number Seven. Likewise in Eusebius' Preparation o f the Gospel, bk. 5, ch. 14, the Sun is called by the oracle o f Apollo the King o f the seven sounding harmony. But by this symbol they indicated that the Sun by his own force acts upon the planets in that harmonic ratio o f distances by which the force o f tension acts upon strings o f different lengths, that is reciprocally in the duplicate ratio o f the distances. For the force by which the same tension acts on the same string o f different lengths is reciprocally as the square o f the length o f the string.
The same tension upon a string half as long acts four times as power fully, for it generates the Octave, and the Octave is produced by a force four times as great. For if a string o f given length stretched by a given weight produces a given tone, the same tension upon a string thrice as short acts nine times as much. For it produces the twelfth, and a string which stretched by a given weight produces a given tone needs to be stretched by nine times as much weight so as to produce the twelfth. And, in general terms, if two strings equal in thickness are stretched by weights appended, these strings will be in unison when the weights are reciprocally as the squares o f the lengths o f the strings. N ow this argu ment is subtle, yet became known to the ancients. For Pythagoras, as Macrobius avows, stretched the intestines o f sheep or the sinews o f oxen by attaching various weights, and from this learned the ratio o f the celestial harmony. Therefore, by means o f such experiments he ascer tained that the weights by which all tones on equal strings . . . were reciprocally as the squares o f the lengths o f the string by which the musical instrument emits the same tones. But the proportion discovered by these experiments, on the evidence o f Macrobius, he applied to the heavens and consequently by comparing those weights with the weights of the Planets and the lengths o f the strings with the distances o f the Planets, he understood by means o f the harmony o f the heavens that the n 6 H 7 weights of the Planets towards the Sun were reciprocally as the squares of their distances from the Sun.
But the Philosophers loved so to mitigate their mystical discourses that in the presence of the vulgar they foolishly propounded vulgar matters for the sake of ridicule, and hid the truth beneath discourses of this kind. In this sense Pythagoras numbered his musical tones from the Earth, as though from here to the Moon were a tone, and thence to Mercury a semitone, and from thence to the rest of the Planets other musical intervals. But he taught that the sounds were emitted by the motion and attrition of the solid spheres, as though a greater sphere emitted a heavier tone as happens when iron hammers are smitten. And from this, it seems, was born the Ptolemaic system o f solid orbs, when meanwhile Pythagoras beneath parables of this sort was hiding his own system and the true harmony of the heavens (18) . There is a piece of personal testimony which confirms Newton's belief in the wisdom of Pythagoras: that of Conduitt.
Sir. I thought Pythagoras's music of the spheres was intended to typify gravity & as he makes the sounds & notes to depend on the size of the strings, so gravity depends on the density of matter (19) . Moreover, Newton's most brilliant disciple, Maclaurin, expressed the same view, though with a slight but significant reservation:
A musical chord gives the same notes as one double in length, while the tension or force with which the latter is stretched is quadruple: and the gravity of a planet is quadruple o f the gravity of a planet at a double distance. In general, that any musical chord may become unison to a lesser chord of the same kind, its tension must be increased in the same proportion as the square of its length is greater; and that the gravity of a planet may become equal to the gravity of another planet nearer to the sun, it must be increased in proportion as the square of its distance from the sun is greater. If therefore we should suppose musical chords extended from the sun to each planet, that all these chords might become unison, it would be requisite to increase or diminish their tensions in the same proportions as would be sufficient to render the gravities of the planets equal. And from the similitude of those proportions the celebrated doctrine of the harmony of the spheres is supposed to have been derived (20) . He goes on to say that: these doctrines of the Pythagoreans, concerning the diurnal and annual motions of the earth, the revolutions of the comets . . . and the harmony n 8 o f the spheres, are very remote from the suggestions o f sense, and opposite to vulgar prejudices; so we cannot but suppose that they who first discovered them must have made a very considerable progress in astronomy and natural philosophy. Gregory too quotes this; his description makes it clear that Pythagoras used sound Newtonian method for his discovery:
Pythagoras afterwards applied the proposition he had thus found by experiments, to the heavens, and thus learned the harmony o f the spheres ( Whence it seems to have been an ancient opinion that matter depends upon a Deity for its laws o f motion as well as for its existence (22) . This passage serves us as a bridge to the material o f the Scholium intended for Proposition IX. W e notice that at the end, Newton states the cause o f gravity, for the ancients, was God. In this draft variant, Newton develops the idea further. After stating that matter is passive and non-active, he says:
These are passive laws and to affirm that there are no others is to speak against experience. For we find in ourselves a power o f moving our bodies by our thought. Life and will are active principles by which we move our bodies and thence arise other laws o f motion unknown to us. And since all matter duly formed is attended with signes o f life and all things are framed with perfect art and wisdom and nature does nothing in vain; if there be an universal life and all space by the sensorium o f a thinking being who by immediate presence perceives all things in it, as that which thinks in us, perceives their pictures in the brain: those laws o f motion arising from life or will may be o f universal extent. To some such laws the ancient Philosophers seem to have alluded when they called God Harmony and signified his actuating matter harmonically by the God Pan's playing upon a Pipe and attribut ing musick to the spheres made the distances and motions o f the heavenly bodies to be harmonical, and represented the Planets by the seven strings o f Apollo's Harp (23) .
The personal testimony o f David Gregory confirms the importance of this set of ideas for Newton's philosophy. His memorandum of 21 December 1705 tells us that Newton would answer the question, 'W hat cause did the ancients assign to gravity?' (in the projected Latin edition of the Opticks) by saying that, 'they reckoned God the cause of it, nothing else, that is no body being the cause; since every body is heavy'. Thus we have in the intended Query, an expression of the Newtonian distinction between passive and active principles in an orderly universe, and the complete dependence of matter, for its existence and motion, on the will of God; and all of this expressed by the ancients through the idea o f 'Harmony'.
The draft Scholium to Proposition IX develops the same theme in greater detail. It starts with Newton's customary abjuring of causal explanations, and concludes with an eloquent passage in which the ancient dieties are assimilated into the one true God.
So far I have expounded the properties of gravity. Its cause I by no means recount. Yet I shall say what the ancients thought about this subject. Thales regarded all bodies as animate, deducing that from magnetic and electrical attractions. And by the same argument he ought to have referred the attraction of gravity to the soul of matter. Hence he taught that all things are full of Gods, understanding by Gods animate bodies. He held the sun and the Planets for Gods. And in the same sense Pythagoras, on account of its immense force of attraction, said that the sun was the prison of Zeus, that is, a body possessed of the greatest circuits. And to the mystical philosophers Pan was the supreme divinity inspiring this world with harmonic ratio like a musical instru ment and handling it with modulation, according to that saying of Orpheus 'striking the harmony of the world in playful song'. Thence they named harmony God and soul of the world composed of harmonic numbers. But they said that the Planets move in their circuits by force of their own souls, that is, by force of the gravity which takes its origin from the action of the soul. From this, it seems, arose the opinion of the Peripatetics concerning Intelligences moving solid globes. But the souls of the sun and of all the Planets the more ancient philosophers held for one and the same divinity exercising its powers in all bodies whatsoever, according to that of Orpheus in the Bowl. Cylennius himself is the interpreter of divinity to all: The nymphs are water. Ceres corn, Vulcan is fire. Neptune is the sea striking the foaming shores. Mars is war, kindly Venus is peace, the Bull-born Horned Bacchus frequenting gladsome feasts Is to mortals and to gods relief of mind from care. Golden Themis is guardian o f Justice and right Next Apollo is the Sun, hurling his darts From afar, circling round, the Divines and the Soothsayers The Epidaurian God is the expeller o f diseases: these things All are one thing, though there be many names (24) . For the material o f this passage, Newton drew heavily on Macrobius, Cicero, Virgil, Porphyry, and the Orphic hymns. In it, he completes the view o f nature which was developed in the earlier Scholia. In those, the universe was seen as comprising innumerable worlds, composed o f immutable atoms, held together by gravity, moving in an absolute void. N ow the immaterial, 'immechanical' cause o f it, is seen to be God himself. Newton states this conception clearly in another manuscript intended for the same unimple mented edition o f the 1690's :
. . . those ancients who more rightly held unimpaired the mystical philosophy as Thales and the Stoics, taught that a certain infinite spirit pervades all space into infinity, and contains and vivifies the And this spirit was their supreme divinity, according to the Poet cited by the Apostle. In him we live and move and have our being (25) . Thus the more ancient philosophers, such as Orpheus, who were closer to the true philosophy, held that gravity was a direct result o f the exercise o f divine power. Later philosophers such as the Ionics, the Italics and Plato reveal themselves to have partial knowledge o f this, if their utterances are properly interpreted. For instance, Newton says o f Plato:
Hence after Plato has, by succession from Pythagorean doctrine and by the divine profundity o f his own genius, shown that apart from these ratios (i.e. musical ratios) there can be no possibility o f conjunction: in his Timaeus, he constitutes the soul of the world by means o f the com position o f those ratios, by the ineffable providence o f God the crafts man. Consequently the soul o f the world, which propels into movement this body o f the universe visible to us, being constructed o f ratios which created from themselves a musical concord, must o f necessity produce musical sounds from the movement which it provides by its proper impulse having found the origin o f them in the craftsmanship o f its own composition (26) . There is little doubt that Newton saw in analogy to musical harmony, the principles o f law and order in the natural world. Such harmony was the profoundest expression o f cosmos. But for Newton, nature operating accord-121 ing to these divine ratios, could scarcely be dependent on the guidance of an intermediate world soul. Rather (as we shall soon see) the exquisite structure of things immediately bespoke the providential governance o f a Divine power actually present in the world.
II
It seems clear from the 'classical' Scholia, and from the testimony of his intimate friends, that Newton considered it necessary to complement his endeavours in natural philosophy by an investigation of the sources of the ancient knowledge that he believed himself to be re-discovering; and also that in that ancient tradition God was conceived as being in the most intimate relation with His creation. The draft Scholia, running parallel to the Propositions of Book III of the Principia, begin with classical views on matter, void, and gravity, and culminate in an affirmation of the ancient knowledge of the divine harmony by which God moved all bodies in the cosmos. Since a 'classical' edition o f the Principia, incorporating these annotations, was never published, it may plausibly be argued that Newton considered these enquiries too speculative, or too incongruous with his inductive natural philosophy, to be made public.
Newton's thoughts on these matters were not, however, kept com pletely concealed. He permitted David Gregory to use the material exten sively in a long historical preface to his physicae et elementa (1702), if without attribution. (It was also available to Maclaurin for his much later work.) More important, the basic thesis of the Scholia is set out, more or less explicitly, in important sections of his two most impor tant scientific works. These passages enable us to conclude that Newton was convinced of the importance of the p r i s c at radition for his philosoph he believed his inductive method would yield as much certainty in historical and theological as in natural-philosophical studies. In both the General Scholium to the second edition of the Principia (1703) as well as the concluding pages of the Opticks (1704), a discussion of God's causal agency in the natural world ends with allusions to the suppressed material of the 'classical' Scholia.
In the General Scholium, Newton's special doctrines of the near-identification of infinite space with God and the assertion of His continuous inter vention in His Creation end, not with a characteristic disclaimer, but with the affirmation:
And thus much concerning God, to discourse of whom from the appearance of things does certainly belong to natural philosophy (27) .
This extension o f the scope o f natural philosophy is significant. It implies that the sequence o f ever more fundamental causes in nature does not stop short o f the First Cause, but includes Him as a legitimate part o f a naturalphilosophical inquiry. That is already implicit in the use o f God's attributes to establish the properties o f atoms; and it justifies the attempt to define the mode o f God's causal agency, as in the 'harmony' mentioned in the Scholium to Proposition IX.
N ew ton's belief in a prisca tradition is expressed in the same passages. In the General S c h o l i u m , a lengthy discussion o f the divine attributes i with the remarks:
And J o b ,xxii, ver. 12, 13, 14. xxiii, ver. 23, 24. The Idolators supposed the sun, moon, and stars, the souls o f men, and other parts o f the world, to be parts o f the Supreme God, and therefore to be worshipped; but erroneously. Newton is asserting here a prisca theologia, an original conception o f divinity from which 'the Idolators' had departed. A parallel prisca is described in a concluding passage o f the Opticks. After examining the attributes o f God and emphasizing His power to vary the laws o f nature in different parts o f the universe, he seems to pass by an abrupt transition to a review o f his method o f Analysis and the manner in which it was employed in the treatise. He then reverts to theological considerations, for . . . if Natural Philosophy in all its parts, by pursuing this method, shall at length be perfected, the bounds o f Moral Philosophy will be also enlarged. (29) . Th e priscasapientiaand the prisca theologia is implicit in the cl Newton's great scientific treatise. A true natural philosophy must lead to a surer knowledge of God, and thence to a firmly-grounded moral philosophy. The curious reference to Noah and his sons can be explained only by the assumption that, if true religion follows from true natural philosophy, then the latter must have served as the foundation for the former in the pristine age before the corruption of Noah and his sons (30) . The supporting evidence from the unpublished material would appear to make that conclusion certain.
Finally, certain stylistic features o f the concluding section of the quoted above, make it plain that when Newton undertook to 'discourse' of God within natural philosophy, he believed that could be done by the same rigorous methods as those employed in mathematics and experimental philo sophy. As mentioned above, in the last pages of the Opticks, a dicsussion o f God's attributes and power is interrupted by a discussion of Newton's method of 'Analysis', consisting in a careful sequence of inductions from observations and experiment. The sequence of causes yielded by this method, could be pursued 'Till the argument end in the most general'. Newton seems to be alluding here to the First Cause or God. That interpretation is strengthened by the succeeding passage, quoted above. The perfection of natural knowledge must lead to a more perfect knowledge of God, with its attendant moral benefits (31).
More direct evidence for Newton's confidence in his method as yielding certainty in theology, as in natural philosophy in the narrower sense, is provided by the qualifications with which he introduces his assertions. In Queries notorious for the cautions with which they are hedged, it is most significant that Newton's theological asseverations are introduced by 'must be allowed', 'nothing else but', and 'no doubt' (32) . It is inconceivable that Newton would have publicly claimed such certainty for these propositions unless they were grounded as firmly for him as the inverse-square law of gravitation and the composite nature of white light.
The published texts discussed above confirm our interpretation of the 124 'classical' Scholia as constituting a serious investigation for Newton. W e see that Newton was prepared to make a public avowal o f his belief that he believed in God's direct intervention in His creation; that theological and historical knowledge could be obtained by the sure method o f inductive analysis; that there was a prisca in theology and philosophy which could be recovered; and that the deepest problem o f natural philosophy, the cause o f gravitational attraction, could only be explained within such a historicaltheological framework. In the light o f these assumptions, N ewton would have every confidence in his interpretation o f ancient sources for his 'classical' Scholia, finding there atoms, gravity and the void, the Copernican System and the inverse-square law. In these principles, there is a direct link with N ewton's immediate pre decessors, the Cambridge Platonists. N ewton's dialogue w ith the Cambridge Platonists, and his concern with the theological implications o f fundamental natural philosophy, were not a passing interest o f his troubled middle years. A passage from de Gravitatione et Aequipond Fluidoru confirms his continuing concern:
. . . some may perhaps prefer to suppose that God imposes on the soul o f the world, created by him, the task o f endowing definite spaces with the properties o f bodies, rather than to believe that this function is directly discharged by God. Therefore the world should not be called the creation o f that soul but of God alone, who created it by constituting the soul o f such a nature that the world necessarily emanates from it. But I do not see why God himself does not directly inform space with bodies; so long as we distinguish between the formal reason o f bodies and the act o f divine will. N ewton's Platonism was not entirely the Platonism o f More and Cudworth, with their stress on such intermediaries as the Hylarchichal Principle; but it was also a Platonism in the spirit o f the early Church Fathers. Still, as in More, Cudworth and the Fathers, the basic world picture o f the 'classical' Scholia emerges from what Newton took to be an 'entire and genuine philosophy' which had been lost. Newton, and the Cambridge Platonists, saw as their task the unification and restoration o f this philosophy. It will be one o f the main tasks o f the remainder o f this paper to characterize further the origin and nature o f this distinctively English tradition o f natural philosophy.
The apparent contradiction between such a traditional Neo-Platonic philosophy, and the stern inductivism o f the Principia, dissolves when we examine more closely how Newton modified the 'mechanical' philosophy o f nature which was current earlier in the century. In one sense he expanded it, by allowing unexplained forces into his explanations of the phenomena; but in a deeper sense he restricted it, especially in its pretensions to knowledge of the natural world. A sign of this restrictive approach appeared in his early work in optics. There, he rejected the arbitrarily formulated hypotheses o f such philosophers as Descartes and Hooke; for they could not from these deduce the phaenomena of nature, and their pictorial mechanisms were incompatible with the laws of such phaenomena. For Newton, the source of their error was that they did not sufficiently appreciate that the mechanical philosophy, rigorously conceived, was simply the estimation of forces in nature by geometrical calculation in terms of matter in motion. This con ception was secured by the brilliant achievements of the At times Newton certainly hoped that he could extend this approach to include the behaviour of the insensibly small particles of matter. But he realized that the most the 'analogy of nature' would allow was the transfer ence of his system of quantitative laws to the motions of such invisible particles. That is, they applied only to the atomical part of his system, to vis inertiae: 'a passive Principle by which Bodies persist in their Motion or Rest, receive Motion in proportion to the Force impressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted!' But the heart of Newton's philosophy of nature, the world of forces and active principles, lay categorically beyond the systems of the Opticks and the Principia. How these principles were to be explained was a great, though hidden, problem of Newton's work. There is evidence that he tried different approaches to it at different periods; and the material of the 'classical' Scholia comes from a time when he seems to have largely abandoned earlier attempts at a quasi-material explanation of forces, and of gravity in particular. However, even when in his later years he again entertained the possibility of an 'aetherial medium', this did not obviate the 'necessity of conceiving and recruiting it (motion) by active principles, such as are the cause of Gravity . . .'. Newtonian forces were never such as to be explained away by aetherial mechanisms; by nature immaterial, they required a different categoy of existence for their explanation.
Thus the ontological problem of causation, conceived in the classical neoplatonic framework, was central to Newton's thought (33) . His failure to solve it is less significant than his attempt to investigate it through a unique combination of methods: a rigorously inductive philosophy, using con trolled experiment and elaborate mathematics; complemented by an historical approach, reconstructing the prisca of the laws of God's agency in the world. 125 In the light of this interpretation o f Newton's programme for philosophy, we may re-examine the significance o f the published Queries. It may well be that their hints and suggestions for further experimental and theoretical work were taken by Newton's successors to be guides to the complete achievement o f the new natural philosophy within the mathematical framework o f the Principia. But in his private thoughts, certainly in the period o f the 'classical' Scholia and probably throughout his life, Newton knew that the programme was incomparably more vast. For he saw the task o f natural philosophy as the restoration o f the knowledge o f the complete system o f the cosmos, including God as the creator and as the ever-present agent (34).
The dream o f a science universelle was not unique to Newton; it motivated the deepest philosophers o f the seventeenth century, as Descartes and Leibniz. Where Newton stands out is in his choice o f materials and methods for such a science, drawing partly on a neoplatonic tradition which flourished in England long after it had declined among leading philosophers on the Continent. That tradition will be examined in the following section.
Ill
The weight attached by Newton to his historical Scholia must appear curious and anachronistic in the light o f the generally-accepted view o f the intellectual milieu in late seventeenth-and early eighteenth-century England. The 1690's witnessed a decisive confrontation in England in a literary battle that had raged through much o f the century: the 'battle o f books' between those who championed and those who contested the superiority o f the moderns over the ancients. In 1694 the young William W otton published his Reflections on Ancient and Modern Learning, a work which gave a careful account o f the scientific achievements o f the century, and, while on the whole acknowledging the superiority o f the ancients in literature, insisted that the moderns had far surpassed them in natural philosophy. W otton's work was a reply to Sir William Temple's defence o f the ancients in his Essay upon the Ancient and Modern Learning (1690). The controversy has been regarded as an indication o f the extent to which the idea o f progress had permeated the general intellectual consciousness by this time, as compared with Temple's circular view o f history (35). Newton's defence o f his systerna mundi by representing it as no more than a return to the views o f the ancients appears reactionary against that background, and not easily reconcilable with the idea of progress.
The discrepancy seems most glaring in Newton, since his system o f the world came to be regarded as the most important argument for the 127 superiority o f the moderns over the ancients. Was Newton, in poring over the fragments of the ancients and elaborating dubious genealogies for his doctrines, reflecting a backward-looking attitude peculiar to him and his circle o f intimates at Cambridge? It would be misleading to accept such a view of Newton's relations to the general intellectual currents of his time. Though a new conception of human progress had been gaining ground through the seventeenth century, there were other conceptions o f the development o f human knowledge whose role can easily be overlooked or minimized if we fix our gaze wholly on the 'idea of progress'. Through them Newton is linked to a certain Renaissance tradition, and, beyond the thinkers of the Renaissance, to the early Greek Church Fathers on whom he relied so con siderably in discovering intimations o f his physical doctrines among the ancients.
'Rebirth', 'rediscovery', not absolute originality but a return to truths well known to men in earlier ages, corrupted and obscured through the centuries: that is recognized as a cardinal characteristic o f the Italian Renais sance. The broad similarity of Newton's scholia with that approach is immediately obvious. A more precise understanding of various prisca traditions and their modifications is necessary before we can place Newton's views in their historical context.
During the Renaissance, the ideal of classical antiquity aided the emer gence and legitimation of a new sensibility and a new view of the world and of man. Innovation and experiment, the break with the traditional culture of the time, could be justified by a doctrine of the 'imitation' o f the ancients, whose civilization typified the perfect models of conduct, arts, philosophy and polity. By the sixteenth century, the 'prisca' concept served, at least for the more critical humanists as a way o f drawing attention to the undoubted superiority which classical antiquity had enjoyed over medieval Europe in civilization and refinement (36) . But there were other thinkers who inter preted the concept much more literally. They wished to demonstrate that the best o f pre-Christian thought owed its excellence to the fact that it repre sented fragments of the only major non-Christian revelation which a Christian could acknowledge, the Mosaic one enshrined in the Old Testa ment. Others postulated a series of partial revelations to humanity, preceding the Christian one, through a chain of theologi (37) . It is not surprising that the most elaborately developed Renaissance prisca doctrine is to be found in the works of leading thinkers of the Platonic Academy at Florence in the late fifteenth century, Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499) and Pico della Mirandola (1463-1494), since their interest was centred upon writings and practices which the Church had traditionally regarded as heretical and diabolic: the magical works o f late antiquity, and especially the newlyrecovered Corpus Hermeticum. Through Ficino's Latin translation o f the Poemander and Asclepius o f Hermes Trismegistus, supposedly an Egyptian contemporary o f Moses, these opinions came to be widely diffused in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (38) .
Tracing pagan wisdom back to Moses was far more cautious and com patible with orthodoxy than postulating a series o f partial revelations, since the unique status o f Old Testament was thus safeguarded. In practice, the two approaches were not kept quite distinct. Ficino, for example, had accused the Neo-Platonists o f having stolen from the apostles and apostolic disciples 'anything sublime that they have said about the divine mind, angels, and other things pertaining to theology' (39) . But the tendency was pursued to such an extreme by other thinkers that every great pagan philo sopher, including Plato, was placed in the debt o f 'Egyptian wisdom'. The attribution was not original. The cult o f 'Egyptian wisdom' found m a n y votaries at Hellenistic Alexandria in late antiquity. Jewish thinkers o f the Alexandrian school sought to reconcile their own religious traditions with the Greek doctrines to which they had been exposed by attributing a Hebraic origin to Greek philosophy (40) . Even before Philo, a host o f treatises had convicted the Greek philosophers o f having stolen from the Hebrews, until Plato (in a famous saying attributed to Numneius) became nothing but 'an Attic Moses'. The Egyptian priests themselves began to claim an Egyptian origin for the doctrines, arts and institutions o f the Greeks. Pythagoras had derived his theory o f numbers, and Democritus his supposed knowledge o f astronomy from the Egyptians and had transmitted these to the Hellenes (41). The Alexandrian Christians gave the Hebraic tradition an important place in Christian apologetics.
Foremost among these was Clement o f Alexandria (d. c. 213 a .d .), founder of the famous Catechetical School, whose authority was regarded as supreme by Newton in his biblical studies. Clement accepted the necessity o f the heritage of Greek philosophy for Christianity. In defending Christianity and seeking the conversion o f pagan intellectuals, Clement employed two basic techniques. One was allegorism. The Old Testament was represented as embodying the moral law; it was inferior to the Gospel, since it worked by fear and not by love. The rest o f it revealed Christ throughout, but in riddles and symbols for those who could read it aright (the postulate adopted byNewton in his studies o f the prophetical books). The other Clementine technique consisted o f tracing Hellenic wisdom to borrowings from the 129 Hebrew prophets, Plato being simply 6 fipiia) ^tAoo-^osr, and Clement's Stromata served through the centuries as he chief handbook of those who claimed an Hebraic origin for Greek science and philosophy (42) . In Clement, as in other Christian apologists like Lactantius, Eusebius, Justin, and St. Augustine, the attribution was supported by the testimony of the mysterious Hermes Trismegistus, regarded as an Egyptian priscus who prefigured the Christian revelation of the future (43) .
In the sixteenth century, the many authors who adhered to these prisca traditions drew upon the authority of these patristic works. By a curious shift, a tactic originally employed to secure the authority of the Christian revelation against pagan philosophy was now used by Renaissance apologists for pagan philosophy. Since what was best in the philosophy of Greece and Rome was borrowed from the Mosaic revelation, Christianity had nothing to fear from the study o f pagan doctrines.
The history of prisca doctrines in the sixteenth century is complicated by the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, and the doctrinal strife between Protestants and Catholics and among the various Protestant sects. The Protestant stress on the Bible at the expense of the mediating Church may be expected to have diminished Catholic enthusiasm for the naked text of the Scripture as the sole repository of God's revelation to mankind. It is certainly true that Catholic writers who continued to concern themselves with the prisca in the post-Reformation period came to be regarded with increasing suspicion by the orthodox. An over-emphasis on the prisca could lead to a depreciation of the uniqueness of the Christian revelation. In the closing years of the sixteenth century, two heretic south-Italian Dominicans, each in his own way, conceived it as their mission to restore the true Hermetic religion. One of these was Tommaso Campanella (1558-1639), who spent twenty-five years in the prison of the Inquisition for his part in a Calabrian revolt aiming to set up an Hermetic 'City of the Sun' (44) . The other was Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), burnt at the stake in Rome, who planned to restore the true Egyptian 'religion of the world', Christianity having been a falling away from that true religion (45) . That is probably the reason for Francesco Patrizi's much less socially revolutionary ideas in his Nova de universis philosophia (1591) being placed on the Index in 1594 (46) .
The prisca doctrines discussed so far were not without significance for natural philosophy, in as much as its adherents wished to substitute a NeoPlatonic explanation, based on secret sympathies and antipathies, stellar virtues, and the microcosm-macrocosm analogy, for the Aristotelian qualita tive physics (47) . A prisca variant more directly concerned with natural philosophy made its appearance in the late sixteenth century. There was a growing interest in the teachings o f the earliest Greek natural philosophers, the Pre-Socratics o f the Ionic and Milesian schools, and ancient atomic doc trines were attracting greater attention. Even in antiquity atomism had been associated with atheism, and its assimilation into a basically religious frame work raised special difficulties. The Democritean universe o f jostling atoms, bereft o f all qualities save the purely quantitative characteristics o f size, figure and motion, needed no Creator, nor special act o f creation. Becoming entangled by chance, they gave birth to bodies and universes, and served to explain all phenomena.
During the late sixteenth century, the diffusion o f the works o f Strabo, Sextus Empiricus, Diogenes Laertius, and Plutarch revived a certain tradition about the origins o f atomism, which, in turn, suggested a prisca doctrine to clothe it in respectability and reconcile it with orthodoxy (48). Relying on a now lost work o f Posidonius, these authorities named a certain Moschus, a Phoenician, who lived before the Trojan war, as the first expositor o f atomism. In 1598, Arcerius, a Friesian philologist, identified Moschus with Mochus, another Phoenician, whose successors Pythagoras (according to Iamblichus) had encountered and conversed with during a sojourn at Sidon. But Arcerius went much farther: he suggested that Moschus-Mochus was no other than Moses himself (49) . It was a momentous identification which proved popular and influential through the seventeenth century. Many leading Protestant scholars lent their support to it. The great Isaac Casaubon (1559-1614) confirmed that Mochus was the Tyrian name for Moses. John Selden (1584-1654) accepted the identification. Gerardus Vossius (1577-1649) discussed Strabo's account o f Moschus's natural philosophy (50) . Although Arcerius's identification o f Moschus with Moses was not univer sally accepted, the derivation o f Democritean atomism from the Hebrews is reflected in such authors as Daniel Sennert (1572-1637), the well-known German iatrochemist, in 1636 (51), R obert Boyle (52), and Pierre Gassendi(53).
But the most sustained attempt to develop these prisca doctrines into a justification for a new and revolutionary natural philosophy by tracing it to the Mosaic revelation, was undertaken in mid-seventeenth-century England by certain thinkers at Cambridge, grouped familiarly as the Cambridge Platonists. Newton was at Cambridge when their influence was considerable. He early became acquainted with their writings. There are striking similari ties between their approach and his, to the relation between revelation and natural philosophy. The views of the Cambridge Platonists must therefore be discussed here in some detail. Joseph Glanvill, who was admitted to Exeter College at Oxford in 1652, regretted having entered Oxford rather than Cambridge where he believed the 'new philosophy' was held in greater esteem (54). It seems certain that the proponents of the 'new' (by which he means the Cartesian) philosophy whom Glanvill had in mind were the Cambridge Platonists. At Oxford, the scientific group which came together from the late 1640's concentrated its attention on the more purely scientific aspects of the work o f Descartes, Gassendi, and other Continental natural philosophers. The Cambridge Platonist approach to these philosophers was guided by different problems and preoccupations. Henry More (1614-1687) had early saluted Descartes as the prince of philosophers, but his deepest interests did not lie in Descartes' more purely technical and scientific output (55) . For him Descartes' main achievement lay in providing a rational demonstration o f the existence o f incorporeal substance, and in offering a grand synthesis reconciling theology and natural philosophy. More saw Descartes as making an enormous con tribution towards building an 'exteriour Fortification about Theology', to repel 'gigantic batteries raised against the belief of the existence of a God, and of a Reward in the World to come . . . (56) . More was writing during the turbulent decades of the Puritan Revolution, when these dangers were felt to have reached unprecedented heights in England. They could be refuted by resorting to the Cartesian cogito argument, and by showing th of the Cartesian postulate of the material world as dead and inert involved the metaphysical necessity of an immaterial principle to set it into motion and preserve its motion.
In attempting to introduce the Cartesian postulate o f a dead world o f matter into Neo-Platonism, the Cambridge Platonists were embarking on a formidable task, running counter to the historical tendencies of that philo sophy. The hylozoistic magical philosophies o f nature in the sixteenth century had drawn inspiration from late-antique Neo-Platonism, and the 'enthusiasts' in Civil-War England had urged the teaching of these philo sophies of nature at English universities in place of the 'rubbish' of scholastic learning (57) . Reacting against them, as well as against Deists, Hobbists and Socinians, the Cambridge Platonists adopted a sharp distinction between matter and spirit, although the distinction lost its Cartesian clarity in their emphasis on a 'hylarchic principle', which was in effect a restatement of Neo-Platonic world-soul as intermediary between God and the universe. In order to assimilate the Cartesian natural philosophy to their Christianized Neo-Platonism, the Cambridge Platonists read Platonic innate ideas into the Cartesian cogito argument, the 'aetherial vehicle' (58) into his First and Second Matter, and, most important, developed an historical thesis about the origins o f the Cartesian philosophy. Since the true revelation in religion as in natural philosophy had been vouchsafed to Moses, Descartes had only rediscovered the true natural philosophy. But that natural philosophy was to be found not in Plato, but as glimmerings in the atheistic Leucippus and Democritus. How was the paradox to be resolved? Greatly expanding Arcerius's suggestion, More proposed that the Mosaic philosophy had passed to the Greeks in two divided streams, the religious part being received by Plato, the natural philosophical part (through Pythagoras) by Leuccipus and Democritus, who had developed it in an atheistic manner. Now, after many vicissitudes, the two had again been welded into the Mosaic whole by Descartes. It is Therefore very evident to me, That the ancient or Judaick Cabbala did consist o f what we now call Platonism and Cartesianism, the latter being as it were the Body, the other the Soul o f Cartesianism; the unhappy disjunction o f which, has been a great evil to both (59) . . . Moses has been aforehand with Cartesius (60) . Henry More's enthusiasm for Cartesianism did not last. Already by 1659 he was urging exceptions to the principle that all natural phenomena could be solved in mechanical terms, instancing gravitation as a phenomenon not susceptible o f a Cartesian or Hobbist explanation (61) . Later he came to reject Cartesianism as paving the way for atheism. More faithful to Car tesianism and to More's sketch o f its historical origins was Henry More's fellow-Platonist, Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688), in his influential True Intel lectual System of the Universe, first published in 1678. Cudworth conducted his discussion on the basis o f a natural philosophy 'called by some Atomical or Corpuscular, by others M e c h a n i c a l' (62), and admitted that in drivi 'all Final and Mental Causality' from the universe, Descartes increased the danger o f atheism (63). The central weakness o f Descartes' approach was that he would not accept causes other than mechanical causes; for Cudworth, over and above purely mechanical processes, there was a 'plastic nature', 'that which makes all things thus to conspire every where, and agree together into one harmony' (64). Cudworth was no more successful than More in attempt ing to combine the Neo-Platonic concept o f nature with the atomical and mechanical concepts o f the new physics in a coherent synthesis, as shown by the fact that theological explanations were introduced by him when the phenomena in question did not easily seem to admit o f a mechanical ex planation. But he was convinced that the mechanical philosophy, 'if rightly understood . . . is the most effectual Engin against Atheism than can be' (65).
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If matter was utterly dead and passive, and there was no motion in the world save that which resulted from contact-action ('heterokinesis'), then it was self-evident that there must be something else in the world besides body or matter. The ancients had rightly apprehended that truth, and had a 'clear and distinct' conception of two basic entities, passive matter, and active power, vigour or virtue-what they had termed 'the Active ' (66). Although Cudworth is primarily concerned with formulating the favourable theological and moral consequences of a 'rightly understood' mechanical philosophy, it is noteworthy that throughout his treatise he relies on an historical mode of exposition, based on the fundamental pre supposition that the true religious, moral and natural philosophy flowed to the Gentiles from the Hebrews, and came to be fragmented and corrupted in the course of time.
The belief in a prisca theologia and in the Hebraic origin of Gree was not restricted to the inner circle of the Cambridge Platonists. 
IV
Newton's earliest commonplace-book at Cambridge shows him imbibing the mechanical philosophy not only from the works o f Descartes, but also from other works which presented it as part o f a long historical tradition, in contradistinction to Descartes' own exposition, which acknowledged no historical debts (67). W alter Charleton's toniana (1654) introduced him to the Gassendist approach, sifting the opinions o f the ancients to establish their concordance with his own philosophy. At the same time, the early writings o f Henry More would have acquainted him with a much more fundamentalist prisca, tracing the new mechanical philosophy to Moses, and making it an essential part o f a new theological synthesis.
Much later, when Newton was developing his 'classical' annotations, he drew considerably on Cudworth's erudite True Intellectual System. His extant notes on the System reproduce almost verbatim Cudworth's account o f Moschus and o f the atomic succession from him (68) . There was a large body o f shared assumptions between Newton and Cudworth. From the earliest period o f his intellectual development, Newton held a view o f the world as comprising both active and passive principles, with the technique later presented in the Principia applying only to inert matter. He believed that conceiving matter as independent o f God, or endowed with self-activity, led to atheism (69). Like Cudworth, he seems to have had the mechanical philosophies of Hobbes and of Descartes, and the 'hylozoistic atheism' o f various English free-thinkers in mind.
Despite these similarities, Newton did not borrow a great deal from Cudworth's learned account in his historical annotations. Cudworth had necessarily confined himself to a very general account of the mechanical philosophy, and buttressed it with his historical learning, while Newton needed support for the details of his own system of the world; and his own classical knowledge was sufficient for the purpose. Besides (70) . Besides Macrobius, Lucretius served as the principal authority on the most ancient natural philosophy. Besides the Greek and Roman authors, the early Greek church fathers, whose works were very familiar to Newton in the course of his biblical studies, were prominently represented, including Clement, Origen, and Eusebius, as well as Cyril and Julian (71) . The only modern author cited was Natalis Conti 1520-1582), an influential sixteenthcentury mythographer, who links Newton with a Renaissance tradition attributing a hidden theological, moral, and natural-philosophical meaning to all the classical myths (72) .
Our treatment so far has stressed the similarities between the early More, Cudworth, and Newton, in order to show that Newton's historical annota tions are by no means as bizarre as they may now appear, but follow a certain intellectual tradition very much alive in Newton's own day. It must also be pointed out that Newton disagrees with the two other authors on certain important points of interpretation. His notes on Cudworth show that he was not merely transcribing his conclusions, but questioned some of them, for example, his condemnation of the 'Egyptian' account of creation as atheis tical (73) . A more important divergence would lie in Newton's anti-trinitarianism. Priscatheories, in the Renaissance as in More, Cudworth, and the industrious Theophilus Gale (74), had generally emphasized the presence o f the notion of the Trinity among the prisci. Since Newton was vehemently opposed to the Trinitarian dogma, which he held to be a comparatively late corruption, these arguments would be uncongenial to him (75) . 135 N or would he accept More's and Cudworth's characterization o f Epicurus and Lucretius as atheistic. As he had told Gregory: 'The philosophy o f Epicurus and Lucretius is true and old, but was wrongly interpreted by the ancients as atheism . . . ' (76) .
The most important difference between More and Cudworth on the one hand, and Newton on the other, lay in Newton's conviction that not the Cartesian philosophy (as More had once held), nor the 'mechanical philo sophy' (in Cudworth's basically Cartesian interpretation), but his own system o f the world represented the restoration o f the true and original natural philosophy, as revealed by God even before the Flood.
In concluding this outline o f the main points o f agreement and dis agreement between Newton and the Cambridge Platonists, attention must again be drawn to the fact that the terms o f the dialogue were set by a certain theological-philosophical tradition. Only against that tradition can N ewton's 'classical' endeavour be understood and explained. Newton's relation to that tradition becomes clearer if we remember that his interpretation o f the texts o f ancient natural philosophy was not the only 'exegetical' exercise which had engaged his attention. He had spent much time and labour on two other fields which demanded highly-developed techniques o f interpretation. One was alchemy, whose practitioners wrapped up their supposed know ledge in a complex symbolism, designed to obscure it from the uninitiated. During the early seventeenth century, Michael Maier (1568-1622), whose works were deeply studied by Newton, had undertaken a survey o f the entire Greek mythology to demonstrate that they represented alchemical secrets (77). Newton's interpretation o f the 'harmony o f the spheres' is analogous, in that it sees it as a symbolical representation o f 'physical' secrets. The other major field employing exegetical techniques was that o f biblical studies, which absorbed Newton throughout his life. In interpreting the prophetical books o f the Old Testament, Newton attempted to show that the prophecies had been fulfilled down to the minutest details.
Both alchemy, as well as biblical exegetics, rested on the assumption that a true body o f knowledge had been available to wise men in the remotest antiquity, and that the knowledge was couched in an enigmatical, symbolical form to conceal it from the vulgar. It is evident that the same assumptions underlie Newton's exegesis of the natural philosophy o f the ancients. His tortuous interpretation o f the Lyre o f Apollo, the Pipes o f Pan, and the 'Harmony of the Spheres' rests on the belief that the true system o f the world was known to the ancients, but had been turned into 'a great mystery' which only the initiates could penetrate. In his studies o f the Old Testament prophecies, Newton was tracing the pristine knowledge of the historical events of future ages; in his alchemical studies, the pristine knowledge o f the constitution o f things; in his studies of ancient natural philosophy, the pristine knowledge of physical nature and the system o f the world. The true meaning of the Old Testament prophecies would only become clear in retrospect, in the light of historical experience. In the same way, the authentic meaning of the ancient natural philosophy would only be revealed when the truths it embodied had been independently discovered by experimental in vestigation; it was thus that Pythagoras-and Newton-had unravelled the mystery of the most ancient 'harmony of the spheres'.
It should be quite clear that Newton's textual analysis o f ancient natural philosophy was not based on a consciously hoc procedure: reading into ancient texts truths arrived at in the course of his scientific work. For him, they represented a deeper penetration into the possible only when the preliminary work had been accomplished through experience. Besides this overriding justification, these investigations could perform a number of different functions. They could provide a pedigree for his own doctrines, to legitimate them for an audience which still widely accepted the idea of a prisca sapientia. He could use them as a direct defence for his own doctrines, as he does in the Opticks (78) , and, on one occasion, during the controversy with Leibniz (79) . Furthermore, the documents dealt with in this paper do not tell us whether his own adoption of the doctrines he ascribes to the ancients preceded his textual studies. Such basic problems as the existence of the void, the properties of matter, and the character of the divine agency lay beyond the experimental procedures he could deploy. Newton's solutions to some of these problems are explained and defended by the analogical reason ing whose patterns he defined in the But the possibility that the ancient texts might have provided clues, and guided his thoughts in one direction or another, can by no means be excluded.
It is also possible to discern the function of the prisca arguments in Newton's more general philosophical concerns. Like Cudworth, he wished to confute 'Hobbists', Deists, and 'hylozoistick atheists', on the basis of prisca arguments (80) . His own variant of the history of the original natural philo sophy, with its insistence on absolutely dead matter, would be his contribu tion to the debate. On the struggle which was taking place on another front, concerning the authenticity and reliability of the Old Testament, Newton's demonstration of a pre-Noachian prisca sapientia would again be a weighty argument. When we recall how deeply Newton was committed to the vindication of the Old Testament account, both in regard to the prophecies 137 and the chronology of the ancient kingdoms (81) , it is evident that it would have been a positive act of abstention on his part to fail to extend this approach to the origins of natural philosophy.
For Newton, all the truths o f God's creation were once revealed, as an interconnected whole which comprised natural, moral and divine know ledge. Though they soon became obscured, they could be recovered by a disciplined method of analysis of experience. 'Hypotheses' were not to be feigned in any of these enquiries: just as the properties of light were to be induced from experiments, so the meaning o f the sacred prophecies could be ascertained from those which had already been fulfilled, and the true natural philosophy of the ancients was to be deciphered on the basis of experimental knowledge already arrived at. A sequence o f inductions could therefore lead naturally from Kepler s laws and the radial acceleration of the moon, through the principle o f universal gravitation, to the unveiling o f the true meaning of the Pipes of Pan.
C onclusion
In the course of our analysis of the 'classical' Scholia in this paper, we have traced the intellectual ancestry of Newton's historical' assumptions and methods, and their development in connection with a distinctive English 'mechanical philosophy'. The analysis has shown Newton's adherence to a particular approach to theological and philosophical problems, influential among many of his contemporaries. The conclusion may be suggested, that it is not really profitable to consider Newton either as 'the last of the magi cians or the first of the scientists'. It is equally unhistorical to try to resolve the problem by imagining a multiplicity of Newtons, one engaging in 'science' and the others dabbling in theology, chronology, and other similar pursuits.
It is certainly difficult for us in the twentieth century to conceive one whose scientific achievements were so great, pursuing with equal interest and energy such other studies, especially when his efforts in those fields produced so little of enduring value. It is even more difficult for us to imagine the mechanics and cosmology of the P r i n c i pb eing influence theological views and his belief in a pristine knowledge. Sir Isaac Newton, however, was not a 'scientist' but a Philosopher of Nature. In the intellectual environment of his century, it was a legitimate task to use a wide variety o f materials to reconstruct the unified wisdom of Creation.
That was the task which Newton attempted. W e cannot fully under stand his scientific successes, without appreciating his endeavour in problems which for him, as for many of his contemporaries, constituted the ultimate problems.
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